



SECURITY REQUIREMENT OF FEDERAL RULES
INAPPLICABLE TO § 70 PLENARY ACTIONS
The trustee in bankruptcy instituted a plenary action alleging a voidable
transfer of property under § 70 of the Bankruptcy Act 1 and under state
law. The district court, sitting as a court of bankruptcy, issued an injunc-
tion pendente lite under the power granted by § 2a(15) of the Act 2 with-
out requiring the trustee to post security as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(c). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that Rule 65(c) is not a restriction upon the powers
granted to the Bankruptcy Court in a pending plenary action under § 70
of the Act.. Halpert v. Engine Air Service, Inc., 212 F.2d 860 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 3097 (1954).
Federal courts in bankruptcy originally were given summary and
plenary jurisdiction to administer the estates of bankrupts.4 The Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 returned control over all plenary actions to the state
courts unless the usual requisites of federal jurisdiction were present.5
However, the backlog of plenary actions in the state courts and the con-
sequent delay in federal bankruptcy administration caused Congress to
exempt plenary suits invoking §§ 60, 67 and 70 of the Bankruptcy Act 6
from the requirements of jurisdiction 7 and to make them cognizable in the
Bankruptcy Court.8 In all other plenary actions, as in any civil action
in the federal courts, procedure is governed by the Federal Rules. The
problem presented by the Halpert case is whether the exception for plenary
suits under §§ 60, 67 and 70 merely removed jurisdictional requirements,
1. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110 (1952).
2. The courts of bankruptcy are invested with such jurisdiction at law and in
equity in proceedings under the Act to "(15) make such orders, issue such process,
and enter such judgments, in addition to those specifically provided for, as may be
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. . . ." 30 STAT. 545
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §lla(15) (1952).
3. "No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the
giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for thd
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. . . .
4. 14 STAT 517 (1867), repealed, 20 STAT. 99 (1878).
5. 30 STAT. 552 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §46 (1952).
6. 30 STAT. 562, 564, 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§96, 107, 110 (1952).
7. 30 STAT. 552(b) (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §46(b) (1952).
8. ". . . where plenary proceedings are necessary, any state court which would
have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any court of bank-
ruptcy shall have concurrent jurisdiction." 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 110e(3) (1952). Similar provisions are found in §§ 60 and 67 of the Act.
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with the result that these suits are also subject to the Federal Rules, or
whether the exception allowed the court to utilize the powers granted to it
by the Bankruptcy Act with the result that the Federal Rules apply only
to the extent that they are consistent with those powers.9
The problem is one of intricate statutory interpretation. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 81a(1) states that the rules do not apply to "proceed-
ings in bankruptcy" except as made applicable by the Supreme Court.
General Order in Bankruptcy 37, promulgated by the Supreme Court,10
requires the Federal Rules to be followed in "proceedings under the Act"
to the extent that they are not inconsistent. Halpert poses the question of
whether Rule Sla(1) and the General Order should be construed
to refer only to summary or to both summary and plenary actions. "Pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy" as found in Rule 81a(1) has been held in other
contexts to relate solely to summary matters." The terminology of Gen-
eral Order 37, "proceedings under the Act," appears frequently in the
Bankruptcy Act and has been interpreted to include both possibilities. In
§ 23a of the Bankruptcy Act,12 which distinguishes plenary from summary
actions, "proceedings under this Act" clearly refers to summary suits.
However, in Willianms v. Austrian ' 3 the same term in § 2a,1 4 defining the
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction and powers, was held to relate to both
summary and plenary suits. If "proceedings in bankruptcy" in Rule
81a(1) and "proceedings under the Act" in General Order 37 are both
interpreted to relate only to summary process, the Federal Rules, including
the security requirement of Rule 65c, clearly would apply to the present
plenary action. The policy of liberal application of the Federal Rules
announced in Rule 1 supports this interpretation.'5 However, if Federal
Rule 81a(1) is narrowly construed, and "proceedings under the Act" in
General Order 37 is broadly interpreted to include both summary and
plenary actions as in the Williams case, the scope of the General Order
9. See text following note 10 infra.
10. 305 U.S. 698 (1939) ; 11 U.S.C. following § 53 (1952). The General Orders
have been held to have the force of law. Orcutt v. Green, 204 U.S. 96 (1907).
11. E.g., Westall v. Avery, 171 Fed. 626 (4th Cir. 1909) ; Lowenstein v. Reikes,
54 F2d 481 (2d Cir. 1931).
12. "The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies
at law and in equity as distinguished from proceedings under this Act, between
receivers and trustees as such and adverse claimants . . . in the same manner and
to the same extent as though such proceedings had not been instituted and such
controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claimants. (b).
Suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be brought or prosecuted only in the courts
where the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings under this
Act had not been instituted . . . except as provided in sections 60, 67, 70 of this
Act." 30 STAT. 552 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §46 (1952).
13. 331 U.S. 642 (1947). The Court held a plenary suit in reorganization
proceedings which was exempt from the jurisdictional requirements of §23 to be
a "controversy" within the meaning of §2a(7), and that, consequently, "proceedings
under this Act" in the introductory clause of §2a must include both plenary and
summary actions.
14. 30 STAT. 545 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1952).
15. Nadler, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Applied to Bankruptcy, 27
J.N.A. REF. BANRm. 49 (1953).
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seems broader than the Federal Rule it seeks to effectuate. The Court in
the Williams case " indicated that its result would have been the same
under the prior wording of § 2a, i.e., "bankruptcy proceedings." 17 If such
an interpretation of "bankruptcy proceedings" is applied to "proceedings
in bankruptcy" in Rule 81a(1), the apparent inconsistency between the
federal rule and the General Order can be reconciled so that both refer to
plenary as well as summary jurisdiction. In Chatz v. Freeman I the
Seventh Circuit adopted the narrow interpretation, holding that Rule
81a(1) excluded only summary actions and that Rule 65c applied to in-
junctions issued in plenary suits under § 67. The court ignored the obstacle
raised by the Williams decision as to the construction of "proceedings under
the Act" in General Order 37, seeming to apply instead the interpretation
given to "proceedings" in § 23a. However, § 23a of the Act is inapplicable
to plenary suits under § 67, and, since "proceedings" is used in a variety of
settings but is not defined in the Act,19 the Chatz court's interpretation was
not dictated by the statute. A contrary decision was reached in Magidson
v. Duggan,20 which held that in plenary actions cognizable in the Bank-
ruptcy Court under § 2, the security requirement of Federal Rule 65c did not
restrict the powers expressly granted to the Bankruptcy Court. The
instant court, relying on that decision,2 1 found that a § 70 plenary action
was excluded by Rule 81a(1), but neither the Magidson opinion nor the
majority opinion of the present court construed the terms of Federal Rule
81a(1) or the General Order.
Even if plenary suits under §§ 60, 67 and 70 are within the exception
of Federal Rule 8la(1), General Order 37 requires the additional deter-
mination of whether the security requirement of Rule 65c is "inconsistent"
with the bankruptcy court's authority under § 2a(15). Magidson v.
Duggan was the first case to hold the Federal Rule inconsistent in a pend-
ing plenary action. Rule 65c previously had been held inapplicable to
injunctions issued under § 2a(15),2 but in those decisions the court was
acting in a summary manner to protect its exclusive jurisdiction. This
rationale does not apply to plenary actions under §§ 60, 67 or 70 because
16. 331 U.S. at 647, 650, 653.
17. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 STAT. 545 (1898).
18. 204 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1953) (2-1 decision), 67 H.uv. L. REV. 512 (1954).
19. In addition to its use in §§ 2 and 23(a), "proceedings" is found in §§ 60, 67
and 70 in connection with plenary, supra note 6. Section 11(e) authorizes trustees
to institute "proceedings in behalf of the estate upon any claim" and refers to "any
proceeding, judicial or otherwise." 30 STAT. 549 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §29
(1952). Section 24 mentions both "proceeding in bankruptcy" and "controversies
arising in proceedings in bankruptcy." 30 STAT. 553 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§47 (1952).
20. 180 F.2d 473 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965 (1950).
21. Instant case at 863.
22. E.g., in re Hudzinski, 85 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1949); in re Lustron
Corp., 184 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied sub norn. RFC v. Lustron Corp.,
340 U.S. 946 (1951) ; In re International Ry., 12 Fed. Rules Serv. 65 c(1) (W.D.N.Y.
1949) ; In re Metzger's Inc., 68 F. Supp. 663 (W.D. Mich. 1946) denied the adverse
party security when an injunction issued in a summary action was continued pending
final determination of a subsequent plenary suit.
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the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in these suits is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with that of the state courts, and the purpose of the injunction,
i.e., to preserve the status quo, is the same as in any civil action in which
security is always required by Rule 65c. Thus, the bond requirement of
Federal Rule 65c does not seem inconsistent with the power of the bank-
ruptcy court to issue an injunction in a plenary suit under §§ 60, 67 or 70
of the Act.
A rule which allows injunctions without bond will not deny the
adverse party the opportunity to secure a bond if the danger of irreparable
damage becomes apparent, for he may seek modification of the restraining
order at any time.P The bankruptcy court may then dissolve the order,
or require the trustee to post security, or direct him to proceed in some
other fashion to hasten the determination of the suit. Moreover, if a bond
is required in every plenary action, even though there is no danger of loss
to the adverse party, the estate may be charged with needless expense or
the trustee thwarted in his duty to collect the assets 24 in those cases where
the trustee must bring several suits. On the other hand, in these plenary
suits the adverse party has greater need of injunctive security than in cases
not involving bankrupts, because, if found to be wrongfully enjoined, he
may be unable to recover the costs and damages which a bond would pro-
vide. In addition, the delay encountered in seeking an injunction bond
only when its need becomes apparent will in many cases dissipate its value
to the adverse party. Where the bankrupt has transferred all of his assets,
it does not seem inequitable to compel the creditors to furnish the security 25
since any property recovered by the trustee will inure to their benefit. The
danger of this alternative is that it may allow the creditors rather than the
trustee to decide which claims will be litigated. Federal Rule 65c allows
broad discretion as to the amount of the bond,26 and the bankruptcy court
may require the trustee to post the minimum security necessary to protect
the adverse party. The cost of injunction bonds is slight,2 7 and, where the
trustee sues in a reasonable belief that the estate has a cause of action,
§ 64 of the Act 2 8 grants him first priority to recover the costs and expenses
of administration from the estate2 9 It does not appear that the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act, to secure the efficient and inexpensive administration
of the estates, will be thwarted by requiring the trustee to comply with the
security requirement of the Federal Rules.
23. There is no record of such a motion in the instant case.
24. 30 STAT. 557 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1952). See Chatz v.
Freeman, 204 F.2d 764, 768 (7th Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
25. 2 CoLima, BANlrUPTCY 1745 (14th ed. 1940) (Cum. Supp. 1953).
26. In Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Alleghany Corp., 28 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), the court ordered a bond of $5,000, to restrain the disposition of $413,325.
27. The present cost of injunction bonds in Philadelphia, Pa., is 2% of the
principal amount. Rates of the American Bonding Co. of Baltimore, Girard Trust
Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa.
28. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1952).
29. In re Josephson, 121 Fed. 146 (S.D. Ga. 1903) ; Lynch v. Lentz, 10 F.2d




OF ANONYMOUS HAND-BILLS SUSTAINED
Defendant was convicted of violating a Los Angeles ordinance which
prohibits the distribution of anonymous hand-bills.3 On appeal, defendant
contended that the ordinance violates constitutional guarantees of freedom
of speech and press. The California Superior Court sustained the con-
viction, holding that the Constitution does not protect the right to be
anonymous, and that the ordinance was a proper exercise of the police
power. People v. Arnold, 273 P.2d 711 (Cal. App. Dep't 1954).
In balancing the police power of the state and the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and press, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the individual's responsibility for profanity and libel,2 as well as for
publications which disturb the peace or attempt to subvert the government,3
but has prohibited the proscription of such literature by censorship or other
means of prior restraint.4 Circulation is given the same protection as pub-
lication,3 and the Supreme Court invalidated ordinances prohibiting the
distribttion of hand-bills 6 or requiring a license for the privilege of dis-
tribution 7 because these broad restrictions on the freedom -of expression
were not justified by the objectives of discouraging fraudulent appeals 8
or of keeping the streets clean. 9 Thus, in Lovell v. City of Griffin,"0 the
1. Los ANGELEs MUNICIPAL CODE § 28.06 provides: "No person shall distribute
any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have printed on
the cover, or the face thereof, the name and address of the following: (a) The
person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same, (b) The person
who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that in the case of a
fictitious person or club, in addition to such fictitious name, the true names and
addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the person sponsoring said hand-bills
shall also appear thereon" (quoted in instant case at 712).
2. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
3. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931).
4. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); See People v. Armentrout, 118
Cal. App. Supp. 761, 769, 1 P2d 556, 560 (1931).
5. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
6. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
7. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
8. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). But cf. Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940). The court said a state could regulate the
manner of soliciting on the streets or holding public meetings but that the statute
in question was invalid because of the discretion with which a license could be
issued.
9. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). Prior to Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), state decisions were split, some sustaining the hand-bill
ordinances as proper police measures to prevent littering of the streets, while others
held the ordinance void because of the restriction on free speech. Following
Lovell v. City of Griffin, several state courts declared broad hand-bill ordinances
invalid, and attempts to distinguish the Lovell case or restrict it to its facts were
reversed in Schneider v. State. See Lindsay, Council And Court: The Handbill
Ordinances, 1889-1939, 39 Micir. L. REv. 561 (1941).
10. 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
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Court objected to the extent of the restriction in an ordinance which cov-
ered all literature and was not limited to that which was contrary to public
morals or advocated unlawful conduct. It has been suggested that a rea-
sonable ordinance confined to offensive literature would be upheld," and
the Court itself has recognized that some limited regulation might be per-
missible.' 2 Free speech restrictions have been sustained where there was
danger of a serious substantive evil 13 or where the legislative power over
the subject was defined clearly. A requirement that newspapers and other
publications must furnish the names and addresses of officers, owners and
stockholders to secure second class mailing privileges has been sustained
under the congressional power to regulate the mails.' 4 The Federal Lobby-
ing Act, 15 which requires registration of all persons who solicit money for
the purpose of influencing legislation through direct communication with
members of Congress, was held in United States v. Harriss 16 not to violate
free speech. The Court said that the possible deterrence from self-censor-
ship was too remote to invalidate a statute plainly within Congress' power
and "designed to safeguard a vital national interest." 17 But in Thomas v.
Collins,'8 a state statute making the right to organize labor unions depend-
ent upon registration of union organizers was held to violate the First
Amendment when applied to enjoin a non-registered organizer from making
a speech, even though the organizer's card was to be issued as a matter of
routine.19 Several state courts have upheld provisions in election codes or
corrupt practices acts which require identification of the writer or publisher
of campaign material.20 Although the courts in these cases said that
freedom of speech did not protect the right to be anonymous, these statutes
were limited to circulars designed or tending to injure or defeat any
candidate or to influence the voters, and were sustained under the state's
power to promote fair elections. A Pennsylvania act which punished the
11. Lindsay, supra note 9 at 583.
12. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940). A statute forbidding importation of obscene books was
sustained. United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48 F.2d
821 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) ; United States v. One Book, Entitled "Contraception," 51 F.2d
525 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
13. The House Committee on Un-American Activities was held to have the power
to punish a witness criminally for failure to answer whether he was a member of the
Communist Party, the Court basing its decision on the serious threat to the national
welfare. Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
14. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
15. 60 STAT. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §261 et seq. (1952).
16. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
17. Id. at 626.
18. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
19. But cf. City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1941) where the
court held valid the requirement of an identification badge for sellers of periodicals,
although the badge was to be given automatically.
20. Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A.2d 137 (1944); State
v. Babst, 104 Ohio St. 167, 135 N.E. 525 (1922); State v. Freeman, 143 Kan. 315,
55 P.2d 362 (1936).
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sending of anonymous communications of a libelous, defamatory, scurrilous
or opprobrious nature was sustained.2 ' Before the Arnold case, the courts
were never confronted with an ordinance requiring identification of those
responsible for all pamphlets without reference to the content.
22
Although it may be argued that the ordinance in Arnold does not
infringe upon free speech and free press because there is no restriction once
the writer and distributor affix their names and addresses, it seems clear
that some writers and distributors will be deterred. If the effect of the
statute merely would be to restrain the publication of those materials which
are subject to civil or criminal sanctions after publication, it could be
sustained as a necessary adjunct to those remedies, since it is difficult to
affix this legal responsibility if the person responsible is unknown. How-
ever, the scope of the ordinance in question is more inclusive than neces-
sary to avert the apprehended harm, for it applies to any hand-bill without
reference to content. The court assumed that writers of non-offensive
material might be deterred, but declared that those who are not willing to
be identified cannot complain about abuse of their constitutional privileges.
Some material which is free from legal objection will be restrained; for
example, many who write letters to newspapers and request that their
names be withheld from publication may be constrained from writing if
they are required to disclose their identity to the public. There are tenable
reasons for the desire to be anonymous, such as the wish to avoid the public
limelight, the fear of censure from friends and business associates, and
the reluctance to be associated with a minority or controversial viewpoint.p
Many of the Federalist papers were signed, not by Madison, Hamilton or
Jay, but with the now famous nom-de-plume of Publius. Although the
opinion does not mention political writings, a serious effect of the statute
may be to discourage the circulation of hand-bills dealing with public mat-
ters, a result which would be incompatible with the purpose of the First
Amendment.24 The courts have always guarded zealously the right of
free expression, justifying exceptions only when the circumstances showed
a correspondingly serious threat.P There has been no attempt here to
21. Commonwealth v. Foley, 292 Pa 277, 141 Atl. 50 (1928).
22. The hand-bill in the Arnold case advocated boycotting a foodmarket which
advertised in a newspaper whose owner was said to be "viciously anti-Negro." It
was distributed by the Equality in Advertising Committee, whose name appeared on
the face of the hand-bill, and the name of the coordinator of this committee also
appeared. It would thus appear that the defendant was convicted because the hand-
bill contained no addresses, as required by the ordinance; but, since the appeal was
based solely on the constitutionality of the ordinance, this fact is not discussed by
the appellate court.
23. See Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd,
345 U.S. 41 (1953).
24. "The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but
any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and
general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the
people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens." 2 COOLEY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LImiTATiONs 886 (8th ed. 1927).
25. See note 23 supra.
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justify this restraint on non-objectionable writings. A statute penalizing
the distribution of offensive anonymous hand-bills 26 would meet the sup-
posed purpose of the legislature in the Arnold case but would not infringe
on the protection always accorded to non-offensive literature.
Constitutional Law-
PAYMENTS TO SECTARIAN INSTITUTIONS FOR
SUPPORT OF STATE WARDS PROHIBITED BY
CHURCH-STATE CLAUSE IN PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION
In accordance with state statute, once children are found to be neglected
or abandoned and, therefore, dependent upon the state, they are placed by
the Juvenile Court in the custody of foster homes or sectarian institutions
of their own denominations.' The Juvenile Court sets the standard rate
of payment for each ward and authorizes the County Institution Districts
to pay each institution an amount based on the number of court wards
cared for.2  A taxpayer brought suit to restrain the Allegheny County
Institution District from making such payments 3 on the ground that these
payments violated Article III, § 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which
provides: "No appropriations shall be made for charitable, educational or
benevolent purposes to any person or community nor to any denominational
and sectarian institution, corporation or association. . . ." 4 The com-
mon pleas court held that § 18 prohibits all payments, regardless of their
purpose, to sectarian institutions. The decree restrained the County Dis-
trict from making further payments but allowed a suitable interval in order
that new arrangements could be made for the wards now in sectarian
26. See, e.g., a Philadelphia ordinance which makes it unlawful ". . . for any
person to fail, refuse or neglect to have clearly printed or written on any literature
printed, reproduced, published or distributed by him, the true name and post office
address of the person causing the same to be printed or written, whenever such
literature exposes or tends to expose any racial or religious group or sect to hatred,
contempt, discrimination or obloquy. . . ." The ordinance also provides for penalties
of $100 fine and thirty days imprisonment. 1946 ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF PHILA-
DELPHIA 536-37.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 269-409 (1939); cf. Oelberman Adoption Case,
167 Pa. Super. 407, 74 A.2d 790 (1950) ; Brown's Estate, 166 Pa. 249, 30 Atl. 1122
(1895).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 269-408 (Supp. 1953). In many cases the Juvenile
Court orders parents of dependent children to reimburse the County Institution
District for payments made to private institutions.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2257 (1941) authorizes each County Institution
District to levy taxes; § 2301 authorizes each County Institution District to con-
tribute money to pay for the support of dependent children committed to its care.
4. PA. CONST. art 3, § 18 provides in full: "No appropriations shall be made
for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes to any person or community nor
to any denominational and sectarian institution, corporation or association: Provided,
That appropriations may be made for pensions or gratuities for military services, and
to blind persons twenty-one years of age and upwards, and for assistance to mothers
having dependent children, and to aged persons without adequate means of support."
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institutions.5 Schade v. Allegheny County Institution District, Equity
No. 1171, Allegheny County, Pa., June 30, 1954.
In discussing this constitutional provision, it is necessary at the outset
to recognize the peculiarly narrow construction given to the word "chari-
table." The language of § 18 would appear to outlaw relief appropriations
to the temporarily unemployed or indigent. However, in interpreting this
section previous courts have said that the state is under a duty to care for
a person if he is completely without means of support.6 Thus, an
appropriation in furtherance of this duty is permitted and is not classified
as "charitable." 7 ' In the instant case the court did not hold the payments
illegal on the ground that the state had no duty to support dependent chil-
dren; instead, it construed § 118 as if it read: "No appropriations shall
be made . . . to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation
or association." Under this reading all appropriations are prohibited,
including those in execution of state duties. Cases interpreting § 18 reflect
an ambiguity in language: whether the section prohibits all appropriations
to sectarian institutions, or only those for "charitable, educational or benev-
olent purposes." Thus, though the first major case interpreting § 18
clearly involved gifts by the state to sectarian institutions,8 dicta indicated
that the purpose of the appropriation was irrelevant. 9 The same conflict
in interpretation appeared in a subsequent case not involving sectarian
institutions.'0  Another case, Collins v. Martin," concerned an appropria-
tion by the legislature to the Department of Welfare to reimburse private
hospitals which had contracted with the Department to treat the indigent
sick. The court found that there was no obligation upon the state to
provide medical care for these people and, therefore, that the appropriation
was "charitable"; 12 however, as in the previous cases, the court also
stated that the purpose of the appropriation was immaterial.'2 Subsequent
5. Instant case at 45 (all page references to instant, case refer to unreported
mimeographed copy). The decree will affect 513 state wards boarding in sectarian
institutions in Allegheny County and, if .affirmed, approximately 6500 to 7000 wards
throughout the state. See instant case, Findings'of Fact Nos. 40-44.
6. Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 AtI. 697
(1932) ; Collins v. Martin, 290 Pa. 388, 139 AtI. 122 (1927) ; Busser v. Snyder, 282
Pa. 440, 128 At. 80 (1925).
7. Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 Atl. 697 (1932).
8. Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 Atl. 440 (1921) (the legislature made
appropriations directly to five sectarian hospitals engaged in charitable work to meet
deficits incurred in this work).
9. Id. at 433, 117 Atl. at 442. The court found the institutions sectarian and
then held that the appropriation violated § 18 without discussing the purpose to which
the money was allocated. Id. at 435-40, 117 Atl. at 442-44.
10. Compare Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 452-53, 128 Atl. 80, 84 (1925), sath
id. at 453-54, 128 Atl. at 84.
11. 290 Pa. 388, 139 AtI. 122 (1927).
12. Id. at 395-98, 139 Atl. at 124-25.
13. Id. at 394, 139 Atl. at 124. "[Section 18] . . . states in short (and this is
the real thought underlying the constitutional provision) that the people's money shall
not be given for charity, benevolence or education, to persons or communities; or for
any purpose to sectarian and denominational institutions, corporations or associations."
(Italics added.) See id. at 398, 1st para., 139 At. at 125, 4th para.
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to these cases § 18 was amended twice in order to allow state appropria-
tions to specific groups, perhaps to avoid the possibility of invalidation by
the courts. 14 However, neither amendment clarified the existing ambiguity.
The instant court not only failed to consider the problem presented by the
ambiguity in § 18 but, in citing copiously from the earlier decisions,
demonstrated that confusion over the interpretation of § 18 still exists.1 5
When § 18 was introduced originally in the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1873, it read: "No appropriation shall be made to any person or
community, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation
or association, for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes." 16 It
is apparent that under this language not all appropriations to sectarian
institutions were prohibited. In response to an objection that the language
was ambiguous because it might be construed to prohibit all appropria-
tions for whatever purpose to "any person or community,"1 7 it was sug-
gested that to remove this ambiguity the section should read: "No appro-
priation for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes shall be made
to any person or community, or to any denominational or sectarian insti-
tution or association." Is The chairman of the committee on legislation
stated that he did not object to this suggested construction 19 and the fol-
lowing week incorporated it substantially when he introduced § 18 in its
present form. Throughout the debate it was recognized that only
appropriations for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes to sec-
tarian institutions were to be prohibited by § 18,21 and an amendment
which was designed to prohibit all appropriations to sectarian institutions 22
was defeated.2s An analysis of the purposes which the framers intended
14. Amendment of Nov. 7, 1933, 1933 Pa. Laws 1557; Amendment of Nov. 2,
1937, 1937 Pa. Laws 2875. For the specific groups enumerated by these amendments,
see note 4 supra. Both amendments were passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature
without debate. E.g., Senate Bill No. 15, 1937 PA. LEGISLATVE J. 22, 67, 68, 81, 92,
618, 619; House Bill No. 128, 1937 id. 100, 449, 504, 583-84, 638-39, 650. No records
of the committee hearings on these bills exist.
15. Instant case, compare court's quoting of Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 128
Atl. 80 (1925), at 23, Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 Atl. 440 (1921), at 34,
with quoting of Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 Atl.
697 (1932) at 26, Collins v. Kephart, supra at 35, Busser v. Snyder, supra at 36,
Collins v. Martin, 290 Pa. 388, 139 Atl. 122 (1927), at 36, 39, 42.
16. 2 DEBATES CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION PENNSYLVANIA 648-49 (1873)
(§ 18 was originally reported as § 21 in vol. 2).
17. 2 id. at 648. The question was raised whether this would prohibit payment
of salaries to state officials. The chairman of the committee on legislation answered,
"The whole section, I think, is clear and explains itself, that 'no appropriation shall
be made for charitable, benevolent or educational purposes to any person, community
or any denominational institution."'
18. 2 id. at 649.
19. Ibid.
20. 2 id. at 696.
21. 2 id. at 666, 669; 7 id. at 384, 394 (in vol. 7, § 18 is referred to as § 19).
22. 7 id. at 393.
23. 7 id. at 394. It was stated, "Now, if we adopt the amendment offered by
this gentleman, it woidd prohibit an appropriation for any purpose whatever. If, for
instance, the State should buy a piece of property from some denominational cor-
poration, this proposed amendment would prohibit the appropriation of any money to
pay for it. That was considered carefully in the Committee on Legislation when this
section was drawn up, and it was worded so as to avoid a difficulty of that sort. ... "
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to fulfill by enacting § 18 also favors a prohibition of only charitable,
educational or benevolent purposes. At the time of the Convention, many
communities which had been damaged by border raids during the Civil
War or by fires and other natural calamities were appointing agents to
lobby for state appropriations and were paying these agents a percentage
of the amount they were able to obtain. 24 The same practice was being
followed by educational and charitable sectarian institutions. The in-
stances of corruption involving these appropriations were many: it was
stated that state officials and legislators had been bribed; 26 that it was
impossible to trace expenditures; 27 and that sectarian institutions had
obtained funds allegedly for charity while using them for sectarian pur-
poses2 In addition to corruption and lobbying, the framers feared that
the state might prefer one community or religion over another in the
distribution of its funds.29 It seems that if the framers believed that the
prohibition of appropriations for only charitable, educational or benevolent
purposes would be adequate to guard against these abuses concerning
"any person or community," the same prohibition should be adequate
regarding "sectarian institutions." After viewing the legislative history
and the purpose of § 18, this interpretation seems correct, and, therefore,
discussion of the instant case should be confined to these three purposes.
The instant court never reached this problem, because it was superfluous
once the court construed § 18 as prohibiting all appropriations to sectarian
institutions.
The word "benevolent" is little more than a synonym for "charitable"
and, since the payments in the instant case are not for educational pur-
poses but are limited by statute to maintenance,30 the main question is
whether the appropriations in the instant case are for "charitable" pur-
poses or in furtherance of a governmental duty. The court in Martin
held that the payments to private hospitals were "charitable" because two
tests were not met: first, the indigent sick, though not able to pay for
adequate medical care, were not necessarily without means of support;
and, second, the payments did not promote directly "the welfare of the
state as a whole." The latter test seems too vague to be useful. In rela-
tion to the first test, abandoned children obviously must be provided for
by others. Moreover, it does not seem unreasonable to impose a duty of
support on the state when it removes neglected children from their homes 31
24. 2 id. at 649, 662, 667; 5 id. at 289 (in vol. 5, § 18 is reported as § 19) ; 7
id. at 377, 383-84.
25. 2 id. at 681, 688; 5 id. at 272, 280; 7 id. at 375, 378.
26. 2 id. at 653-54, 660.
27. 5 id. at 272.
28. 2 id. at 666; 5 id. at 283, 289-90; 7id. at 394.
29. 2 id. at 673, 695; 5 id. at 278, 283.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 269-408 (Supp. 1953).
31. Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc'y Guardian v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85,
66 A.2d 300 (1949); Brown's Estate, 166 Pa. 249, 30 Atl. 1122 (1895); Ex parte
Crouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 9 (1839).
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and cannot recover payment from the parents. In any event, whether a
court today would make the same policy judgment as to the ability of the
indigent sick to support themselves is doubtful. The subjectivity of the
two tests employed in Martin demonstrates that the concept of "charitable"
does not lend itself to a pragmatic definition. Moreover, to retain the
degree of flexibility necessary to effectuate the purposes of § 18, a com-
prehensive definition may be undesirable. One reason why the court in
Martin may have held that the appropriation was "charitable" was that
the administrative controls were inadequate to eliminate the abuses which
the framers feared. In both Martin and the instant case strict accounting
procedures over the disbursements of money existed8 2 to eliminate the
danger of corruption and insure that the state payments would not be
misused for sectarian purposes. However, as the court recognized in
Martin,a3 the Secretary of Welfare exercised discretion in deciding which
private hospitals were to receive contracts. Thus an opportunity existed
for favoritism in the distribution of state funds, and it was to the advantage
of the sects to lobby for these contracts. In the instant case the sect is
selected according to the fortuitous factor of the child's religion
8 4 There-
fore, lobbying is largely obviated, and the only possibility for state favor-
itism is in choosing an institution from the many in each sect. Since the
increasing number of dependent children has created a demand for more
institutions,as it is likely that the state will utilize all child caring institu-
tions which meet its standards.
In light of the foregoing analysis, whether the solution to cases arising
under § 18 is based upon the ability of the recipient to support himself or
the opportunity for corruption and its related abuses, it appears that the
instant case should be reversed. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind
that allowing the state to pay sectarian institutions for the care of de-
pendent children is not without danger. The framers clearly intended to
permit the state to appropriate funds to these institutions for some pur-
poses, such as the state purchasing land from a church. However, utiliza-
tion of the concept of "state duty" could constitute a greater penetration of
the wall between church and state than intended by the framers. The
solution to this problem lies not in straining the language of § 18 so as to
prohibit all appropriations, but in an enlightened construction of the con-
cept of "state duty" by the court.
32. In the instant case the Juvenile Court maintained separate records showing
the amounts disbursed for the support of each ward. Findings of Fact Nos. 50, 54;
PA. STAT. AN. tit. 11, §269-423 (1939). In the Martin case the Department of
Welfare promulgated standard accounting procedures to be followed by the hospitals
and also set up certain criteria in order to ascertain those patients for which the hos-
pitals would be entitled to reimbursement. Transcript of Record, pp. 126a-138a,
Collins v. Martin, 290 Pa. 388, 139 Atl. 122 (1927).
33. 290 Pa. 388, 398-99, 139 Atl. 122, 125-26 (1927).
34. See text at note 1 and note 1 opra.
35. Instant case, Findings of Fact Nos. 20, 29, 42-43.
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Insurance-
INSURER'S OBLIGATION TO DEFEND DETERMINED
SOLELY BY ALLEGATIONS OF INJURED
PARTY'S COMPLAINT
The insurance company contracted "to pay on behalf of the insured
all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of
liability imposed upon him by law for damages . . . because of bodily
injury . . . caused by accident," the policy providing that "assault and
battery shall be deemed an accident unless committed by . . .the insured."
The company was obligated to defend "any suit against the insured alleging
such injury . . . even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent."
Settlement by the insured was prohibited, except at his own cost. A third
party sued the insured and alleged in his complaint that while in the in-
sured's tavern he had been assaulted by the insured. The company refused
to defend, whereupon the insured settled the suit and brought this action
for breach of the policy to recover the amount of settlement. He asserted
that the third party's complaint was false in that the injuries resulted from
an altercation among his patrons, and that the injured party's action was
therefore covered by the policy. Preliminary objections to the insured's
complaint were overruled, and the appellate court affirmed.' On appeal,
the supreme court reversed, with three justices dissenting, holding that
the duty to defend is measured solely by the allegations of the third party's
pleadings even though the facts of the incident, if proved, might be different.
Wilson v. Maryland Casutlty Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304 (1954).
A majority of courts have held that an insurer's duty to defend is to
be determined by the complaint of the injured party 2 but other courts,
including the Pennsylvania Superior Court, have denied the insurer the
right to ignore the actual facts surrounding an alleged injury.3 In adopt-
ing the majority view, *the instant court interpreted the "suit
alleging" phrase of the defense clause in its legalistic sense. The effect of
this approach is to require the insured to bear the cost and risk of prosecut-
ing the first suit successfully and thus to preclude settlement advantageous
to both the insured and the insurer, unless the insurer's obligation to
defend is invoked through either a formal amendment or new suit by the
1. 173 Pa. Super. 486, 98 A.2d 752 (1953). -
2. E.g., Fessenden School, Inc. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 124,
193 N.E. 558 (1935); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Ohio St.
382, 59 N.E2d 199 (1945); 8 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW & PRAcrcE § 4683
(1942).
3. E.g., Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F2d 291 (10th Cir.
1941); Marshall's U.S. Auto Supply, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 354 Mo. 455, 189
S.W.2d 529 (1945); University Club v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 124 Pa.
Super. 480, 189 Atl. 534 (1937). The defense clauses involved in these cases required
the insurer to defend suits "on account of such injuries" rather than "alleging such
injuries" as in the instant case; these decisions, however, were not based on the word-
ing of the clauses.
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third party averring a claim for negligence. An insurance policy, how-
ever, is a "contract of adhesion," 4 prepared by legal draftsmen to be
accepted by laymen,5 and should be construed as reasonably understood
by the insured.6 In considering the policy as a whole, laymen might well
conclude that any litigation arising from an accidental injury would be
handled by the company, despite the manner in which the injured party
presented his claim. Moreover, the injured party's complaint does not
seem to be a useful method of determining the true basis of his claim.
Pleadings tend to be inaccurate because they are drawn by an attorney
personally unacquainted with the facts and with an eye to litigation
strategy; 7 this situation is magnified under new rules of procedure which
have liberalized the admission of amendments.8 The instant court feared
that a standard embracing the actual facts would force the company to
defend on the word of the insured.9 The insurer, however, is in a position
to decide whether or not to defend after a preliminary investigation of the
facts, since it would not be liable for breach of the defense clause unless!
the insured could prove in a subsequent suit against it that the injured
party had an enforceable claim within the policy and that the insured had
made a reasonable settlement.'0 Of course, if the insurer assumes the
defense at the urging of the insured, and the plaintiff obtains a judgment
on a theory not covered by the policy, the insurer should not be estopped
to deny liability." But the court should consider that the insured may not
always be benefited by insisting that the insurer defend; the insurer's in-
terest in the outcome of the litigation would conflict with that of the insured,
since judgment for the injured party on the original complaint would absolve
the insurer of liability.
Even if the company had no duty to defend the injured party's suit,
the insured should be given an opportunity to prove that he incurred a
4. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HIv. L. REv. 198,
222 (1919).
5. See Schultz, The Special Nature of the Inmsurance Contract, 15 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PRos. 376 (1950), for a comprehensive analysis of insurance contract
construction.
6. See 13 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 7481; 3 ConRBi, CoNTRActs § 559
(1951) ; 1954 Wis. L. REv. 335.
7 See Griffith, Truth in Pleadings, 21 Miss. L.J. 463 (1951).
8. See 2 ANDERSON, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACricE rule 1033 (1950); CLARK,
CODE PLEADING C. 12 (2d ed. 1947).
9. Instant case at 591-92, 105 A.2d at 306.
10. See Murphy & Co. v. Manufacturers' Cas. Co., 89 Pa. Super. 281, 285
(1926) ; 8 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, §4690.
11. When an insurer asserts its right to defend, with knowledge that the
plaintiff's claim may be outside the policy, it usually is estopped from denying lia-
bility. To protect its rights fully, an insurer should obtain a non-waiver of rights
agreement before undertaking the defense, or seek a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine its rights; the latter course, however, is not available in Pennsylvania. Eureka
Casualty Co. v. Henderson, 371 Pa. 587, 92 A.2d 551 (1952). See 8 APPLEMAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 4692-93; Note, 2 STAN. L. REv. 383 (1950).
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liability within the indemnifying provisions of the policy. Had the insured
defended and lost because he was found negligent toward the injured
party, the insurer would be liable thereon.12 So too, where an insurer
waives the clause prohibiting settlement by the insured, the insured may
settle a claim and recover from the insurer upon proof that the claim was
covered by the indemnity clause.13 Such a waiver need not be express but
may be implied from the conduct of the insurer. Thus, courts have con-
structed waiver even before suit was brought where the insurer repudiated
liability for an injury by denying policy coverage 14 and where the insurer
unreasonably delayed determination of a claim.1Y In the instant case the
company neither investigated nor attempted to deal with the claim of the
injured party, which may have been a claim for accidental injuries within
the policy. The company's inaction forced the insured either to disregard
the no-settlement clause, by settling both the wilful trespass suit and the
"accident claim" simultaneously, or to bear the cost and risk of litigation.
Such a situation would seem to present a factual issue as to waiver.' 6
Even in the absence of waiver there is some authority for holding that
policy coverage may be determined in a collateral suit for recovery against
the insurer.17 In the instant case, the insured's complaint was based on
the right to recover for the company's refusal to defend the trespass suit;
it did not specifically aver a cause of action within the indemnity clause
including an admission of his own liability under the policy However,
the insured alleged some elements of such a claim when he stated that the
injuries of the third party were accidental, and when he sought damages
solely for the amount of settlement, not for the costs of defense. But since
the remedy of indemnity was not raised by the briefs or by the lower court
opinions,18 the instant court's failure to consider the question cannot be
interpreted as prohibiting such a suit if properly instituted.
12. West Philadelphia Stock Yard Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 100 Pa. Super.
459 (1930) ; 8 APTEAN, op. cit. mtpra note 2, §§ 4689, 4691.
13. 8 APf'LLMAN, op. cit supra note 2, §§ 4690, 4714. See generally Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HAv. L. REV. 1136 (1954).
14. Murphy & Co. v. Manufacturers' Cas. Co., 89 Pa. Super. 281 (1926) ; accord,
Roberts v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 376 Pa. 99, 101 A.2d 747 (1954).
15. Interstate Cas. Co. v. Wallins Creek Coal Co., 164 Ky. 778, 176 S.W. 217
(1915).
16. Cf. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines v. Baltimore Am. Ins. Co., 97 F.2d 801 (8th
Cir. 1938) (waiver question for jury).
17, Cf. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th
Cir. 1949); accord, Vaksman v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 172 Pa. Super.
588, 94 A2d 186 (1953). Contra: Keystone Lumber Co. v. Security Mut. Cas. Co.,
103 Pa. Super. 154, 158 Atl. 314 (1931) ; see Renschler v. Pizano, 329 Pa. 249, 254,
198 Atl. 33, 35 (1938).
18. Justice Musmanno, in his dissenting opinion of the instant case, considers
the insured's complaint apart from that of the injured party, but the "indemnity
argument" is used only to find a breach, of policy in the company's refusal to defend
the first suit.
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Internal Revenue--
SEPARABILITY OF SERVICES UNDER § 107(a)
OF 1939 CODE DETERMINED BY STATE LAW
Petitioner, a New York lawyer, was the attorney and one of three
trustees for an estate. In 1942 he received attorney's fees amounting to
20% of the total legal fees he earned from the estate, and he received the
remaining 80% on termination of the estate in 1948. Before 1948, peti-
tioner had received over half of his trustee's commissions. In computing
his 1948 income tax, petitioner allocated his attorney's fees of that year
over the preceding seven years under § 107(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939.' The Commissioner disallowed the computation on the
ground that petitioner's services as attorney for the estate were not sever-
able from his duties as trustee and, therefore, less than the required 80%o
of his compensation had been received in the taxable year. The Tax Court
held that under New York law 2 petitioner's legal services to the estate
were separate and distinct from his services as trustee. Leon R. Jillson,
22 T.C. No. 132 (1954).
Section 107(a) was enacted in 1939 to prevent hardship to taxpayers
who worked on projects over long periods of time, received no compen-
sation until the completion of the project, and were subjected to high sur-
taxes on income reported in one taxable year.3 Taxpayers have at-
tempted to separate related services to meet the requirement that at least
80% of the income must be received in one taxable year, while the Com-
missioner also has attempted to separate services in order to disqualify
taxpayers claiming that the services were performed over at least 36
months.4 The courts have disallowed separation of services claimed simply
because the income was received from different sources; for example, a
trustee may not separate commissions on income from commissions on
the corpus of a trust. Similarly, a corporate officer may not separate his
salary paid by the corporation from compensation under an agreement
1. Int Rev. Code of 1939, J 107(a), as amended, 56 STAT. 837 (1942), now
INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 1301, permits ratable allocation of income to past tax
years:
"If at least 80 per centum of the total compensation for personal services covering
a period of thirty-six calendar months or more . . . is received or accrued in one
taxable year by an individual or a partnership. .. ."
2. The court cited N.Y. SUBROGATE'S CoUaT AcT, §§ 231-a, 278, 285-a.
3. SEN. REP. No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1939); 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 528-
29. See 32 N.C.L. REv. 356 (1954).
4. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 445 (1954).
5. Paul H. Smart, 4 T.C. 846 (1945), aff'd, 152 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1945);
Kingsford v. Manning, 109 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.J. 1952); W. Harold Warren, 20
T.C. 378 (1953). Cf. Harry Civiletti, 3 T.C. 1274 (1944), aff'd, 152 F.2d 332 (2d
Cir. 1945) (commissions for receiving the principal not separate from commissions
for paying it out); Ralph E. Lum, 12 T.C. 375 (1949) (not allowing separation
at times of rendering accounts for trustee's commissions); Gordon S. Wayman, 14
T.C. 1267 (1950) (services as an accountant for an estate not separate from
services as deputy and substitute trustee).
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of reorganization with bondholders.0 Where the income has come from
the same source but was received for somewhat dissimilar projects, the
courts also have not allowed separation of services; thus, a contract super-
visor may not separate salary under employment contracts with one
employer from a commission on a particular contract for which he bid and
supervised.7  In line with these decisions, the Tax Court in Rosalpie A.
Lesser 8 refused to allow a tax attorney-executor to separate his income
for legal services from his executor's commissions, reasoning that his
services as tax attorney for the estate enabled him to perform his duties
as executor more capably. However, in E. A. Terrell9 the court held
that the president of a corporation may separate general services from
those in preparing expert engineering testimony for a patent suit of the
corporation. The Tax Court in Jillson, citing only the Terrell case for
support, apparently based its finding that the services were separate on
the fact that, under New York law, the trustee could have hired another
lawyer to act as attorney for the estate. Since outside tax counsel also
could have been hired in the Lesser case,10 the only distinction"
1 between
that case and Jilison is the state probate law governing compensation. In
Jillson, compensation was awarded under the New York Surrogate's act
which provides for legal fees of a fiduciary-attorney.'1 Since California
has no comparable provision, the probate court made a determination that
Lesser, who was an executor, could act as tax counsel for the estate in the
same manner as an outside attorney is and, later, allowed him compensation
under the code section providing for extraordinary services rendered as
6. George J. Hoffman, Jr., 11 T.C. 1057 (1948).
7. J. Mackay Spears, 7 T.C. 1271 (1946). Accord, Harry Boverman, 10 T.C.
476 (1948) (commission on insurance sold not separate from salary); Eugene J.
Phillips, P-H 1946 T.C. Mz.. DEc. 46,279 (an alternative holding is that additional
compensation from law firm for work on specific case is not separate from salary
received from firm).
8. 17 T.C. 1479 (1952).
9. 14 T.C. 572 (1950), nonacq., 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 6. Cf. Bertha Kirkpatrick,
P-H 1944 T.C. Mza. DEc. 44,403 (services as bookkeeper separate from services
as housekeeper, nurse, and dietitian for same employer). See also Heath v. Early,
77 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 170 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1948) (attorney's fee from
non-client stockholders on court order are separate from fees from client stockholders
although they were for same service). This decision has not been followed and was
question in George J. Hoffman, Jr., 11 T.C. 1057 (1948). INT. REv. Cons o"
1954, § 1301 does fiot allow separation merely because the source of compensation is
different.
10. CALFoiuxA PROBATE CoDE § 902 (1953).
11. The court attempted to distinguish Lesser by holding that the present at-
torney's duties, unlike those of Lesser, were "rendered and compensated separately
and only in connection with his official duties!' as trustee. Instant case, 1954 CCH
TAx CT. REP. 3177. A possible distinction is that the amount of compensation
Lesser received was determined by an agreement between trustees dividing all the
extraordinary fees. It is also possible that Lesser's share included compensation
for other services than tax counsel. However, the Lesser opinion does not con-
sider these facts.
12. N.Y. SuorATs S Couar Acr §285-a. Is re Maas' Estate, 38 N.Y.S.2d 261
(Surr. Ct 1942).
13. Rosalyne A. Lesser, 17 T.C. 1479, 1481 (1952).
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executor.14 In previous Tax Court decisions, 15 various state probate
provisions setting rates of compensation have been rejected as compelling
a separation of services, on the ground that the rates set by these par-
ticular provisions were not based on the different nature of the services.
In light of Jillson, the past decisions could be interpreted as viewing state
law as the determinant rather than the relation of the services themselves.
This formulation is undesirable because the rates of compensation in
probate matters are designed only to measure the amount of work various
fiduciaries have performed in order to allow them adequate compensation,
and not to determine the relation of the services. Moreover, all states
supervise the legal fees of a fiduciary-attorney more closely than those of
an outside attorney; 16 therefore, the differences in various probate pro-
visions governing a fiduciary-attorney's legal fees are not relevant to the
question of the separability of the services, but merely to the amount of
restriction in any jurisdiction.
Tax Court decisions have not provided definite factors to be used in
determining what constitutes a set of services under § 107(a). This
section was reworded as § 1301 of the new Code to obtain a more specific
concept than that of "income from personal services," and to emphasize
that the income must relate to a particular project on which the taxpayer
worked.' 7 Under § 1301,18 income must be from "an employment," de-
fined as "an arrangement or series of arrangements for the performance
of personal services by an individual . . . to effect a particular result
regardless of the number of sources from which compensation therefore is
obtained." 19 This is little more than a one sentence summary of the Tax
Court's formulation of set of services. 20 Whether § 1301 would affect
the Jillson decision probably will be determined by the interpretation of
the phrase "to effect a particular result." If the result of a fiduciary
acting as his own attorney is considered to be the ultimate benefit to the
estate, then the services will not be separable; they will be separate if the
result is said to be the securing of legal services for the estate. The sec-
tion is no guide for determining which construction should be used. The
role that state law should play in determining "an employment" is dimin-
14. CALIFORNIA PROBATE CODE § 902 (1953). Usually a fiduciary-attorney may not
receive compensation for legal services under California law. Estate of Lair, 70
Cal. App. 2d 330, 161 P.2d 288 (1945) ; Estate of Scherer, 58 Cal. App. 2d 133, 136
P.2d 103 (1943) ; in re Parker's Estate, 200 Cal. 132, 251 Pac. 907 (1926).
15. See, e.g., the first five cases cited in note 5 supra.
16. See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS 1389 (1939).
17. SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 445 (1954).
18. INT. RE V. CODE OF 1954, § 1301 (a) incorporates the requirements of § 107(a)
but substitutes "an employment" (defined in § 1301 (b)) for "personal services."
19. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 1301 (b).
20. This section will preclude separation of services simply because the source of
payment is different, as in Heath v. Early, 77 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 170
F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1948). The committee report also shows Congressional approval of
such cases as James D. Gordon, 10 T.C. 772 (1948) (unsuccessful efforts included in
period of project), and Jack Rosenzweig, 1 T.C. 24 (1942) (judgment from plagiarism
suit not income from personal services). SEN. REm'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
446 (1954).
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ished in importance by the functional approach of § 1301, although it is
not mentioned in the language of the section or in the legislative history.
It seems impossible to reconcile the decisions in .Jillson and Terrell
with that of Lesser. The court in Terrell emphasized the taxpayer's
special training as an engineer in concluding that his services as expert
patent witness were separable from his activities as president of the cor-
poration. However, this was not a case of a president who happened to
be qualified to render engineering services, but of an engineer who formed
a corporation to utilize his own patents and who was president and
majority stockholder of this corporation. The Lesser case also involved
an individual serving in two capacities, one of which called for special
training. Here, however, the court attempted to determine whether each
service facilitated the performance of the other and found that they did,
on the grounds that the taxpayer's legal services enabled him to be a more
capable executor and that the taxpayer's capacity as attorney was sec-
ondary by virtue of the fiduciary duty which he owed to the estate. If the
ultimate determinant is to be the taxpayer's specialized training for a
particular capacity, all cases involving a combination of skills, such as
attorney-fiduciary or accountant-fiduciary, will be considered two employ-
ments, a result that does not seem to have been intended by Congress.
On the other hand, the test of whether performing one task facilitated
performance of the other would be more in accord with the functional
definition of the Code, because it would necessitate analyzing the relation
of the services themselves, but probably would prove to be too subjective
a test.
Internal Revenue--
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY FOR LIFE INSURANCE
PROCEEDS LIMITED TO CASH SURRENDER VALUE
In 1930 a taxpayer purchased four insurance policies on his life,
naming his wife as beneficiary but reserving the rights to change this
designation and to receive the cash surrender value. Although later he
changed the beneficiary on two of the policies, the proceeds were never
payable to his estate. He died in 1949; his estate was insolvent and owed
four hundred thousand dollars for income taxes from 1929 through 1938,
but there was no evidence that he had been insolvent at any time prior to
his death. The Commissioner instituted proceedings against the bene-
ficiaries under § 311 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,1 which
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §311(a) (1), 53 STAT. 90 (1939), now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 6901 (a) (1). The amount of liability is determined as follows:
"(1) Transferees. The liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property
of a taxpayer, in respect of the tax . . . imposed upon the taxpayer by this chapter.
"(f) Definition of 'Transferee.' As used in this section, the term 'transferee'
includes heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee."
INT. REv. Com oF 1954, § 6901 (h) adds "donee" to the definition of a "transferee."
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imposed responsibility for income tax2 deficiencies on "transferees of
property" to the extent of the property received. The Tax Court held
the beneficiaries liable for the face value of the policies; 3 the court of
appeals reversed and held that the cash surrender value was the only
"property" of the deceased which had been transferred. Rowen v. Com-
missioner,4 215 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1954) (alternative holding). 5
Section 311 was enacted to prevent an insolvent taxpayer from dis-
posing of assets to avoid the payment of income taxes. 6 It imposes two
conditions before the assets of a third person can be reached: first, these
assets must have been received by transfer; second, the transferee must be
subject to liability at "law or in equity." This liability is denominated in
such general terms that the proper interpretation seems to be that state law
governs; but the question of whether there is a transfer, and how much is
transferred, is a matter of federal statutory interpretation.6' In the case of
life insurance policies, where the insured retains no incidents of ownership a
transfer takes place each time a premium payment is made; but where the
insured retains sufficient incidents of ownership, as the right to receive
the cash surrender value and change the beneficiary, then no transfer takes
place until death. Prior courts have been more concerned with finding a
transfer than with considering whether the amount transferred might be
other than the face value of the policy. In Kieferdorf v. Commissioner,
7
proceeds of policies payable to the insured's estate passed to his wife by a
court order. Since the estate had received the full proceeds, the petitioner
properly was held liable for the face value of the policies. In Flore-ne
Pearlman,s since the insured had changed the beneficiary from his estate
to his wife while he was insolvent,9 the Tax Court found that he had
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6901 (a) (1) contains similar provisions for the col-
lection of deficiencies in estate and gift taxes as well.
3. Ruth Halle Rowen, 18 T.C. 874 (1952).
4. The court also held (1) that the petitioners were exempt from all liability be-
cause N.Y. INS. LAW § 166 exempts the proceeds from the claims of all creditors.
and (2) that the transfer did not render the decedent insolvent, as under the New
York cases a transfer under an insurance policy payable to one other than the
insured occurs when the first premium is paid.
5. United States v. New, 5 CCH FED. TAx REP. 9706 (7th Cir. 1954), on
similar facts follows Rowen in limiting liability to the cash surrender value.
6. The House committee report listed several methods of disposing of assets
which the Act was designed to prevent, e.g., "Personal property of a decedent may be
transferred to the beneficiaries without prior settlement of taxes accruing during the
life of the decedent." 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 354.
6a. See instant case at 648. The question of whether liability depends on state or
federal law was reserved in Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 602 (1931), and
the circuits are not in agreement. See Comment, 94 U. OF PA. L. REv. 434, 435
(1946). Commissioner v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 141 F.2d 774, 777-78 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 751 (1944), holds that whether there is a transfer is a
federal matter.
7. 142 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1944).
8. 4 T.C. 34 (1944), aff'd, 153 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1946).
9. Insolvency of the taxpayer is an essential requirement of transferee liability.
Wilson v. United States, 100 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1938). For a treatment of these
and other requirements, see 9 MfRTENs, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATioN 494-536 (1943).
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transferred the face value of the policies. Although, ostensibly, the Tax
Court held the full proceeds were property of the insured at the time of
the transfer,10 this was not essential to the holding, for, as the instant court
pointed out, the tax deficiency was less than the cash surrender value of
the policies." While Pearn-an held that an actual transfer is essential to
transferee liability,'2 later cases have often constructed a transfer.13 In
Margaret A. Tyson,14 the taxpayer's wife was at all times the beneficiary,
and the insured was insolvent only at the time of his death. The Tax
Court held the beneficiary liable for the full proceeds of the policies on the
theory that where the right to change the beneficiary has been reserved
failure to substitute the insured's estate as beneficiary imposes an "equi-
table liability" on the transferee.' 5 This construction was rejected by the
court of appeals, which held that, since the insured had borrowed the full
cash surrender value of the policy and was not insolvent until death, there
was no transfer.16 The circuit court's holding was not based on statutory
"property," as Rowen, but rather on the conclusion that no transfer con-
templated by the Internal Revenue Code had occurred.
While the instant court's construction of the statute seems proper,
its conclusion that the only property of the insured was the cash surrender
value of the policies should be analyzed. Economically, life insurance
consists of a group of people paying certain amounts each year in order
to provide for the beneficiaries of those who die in that year, and, in this
sense, proceeds payable to the beneficiary of any insured do not entirely
represent property of that insured. However, the normal premium pay-
ment represents not only amounts needed for current insurance protection,
but also savings to create a reserve for payment of death benefits. The
insured has a property interest in this reserve, and also in the proportional
portion of that part of a premium paid in advance which is used for insur-
ance protection. The cash surrender value, which is computed by de-
ducting a surrender charge from the accumulated reserve, is always less
than the theoretical property interest in a policy.'
7
10. Where the insured changes the beneficiary while insolvent, state courts
generally consider it to be a fraudulent conveyance, but do not agree as to the amount
available to creditors. A few allow recovery of the full proceeds, e.g., Love v. First
Nat'l Bank, 228 Ala. 258, 153 So. 189 (1934); some allow recovery of the cash
surrender value, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hitchcock, 270 Mich. 72,
258 N.W. 214 (1935) ; others restrict recovery to the amount of premium payments
made while insolvent, e.g., State ex rel. Wright v. Tomlinson, 16 Ind. App. 662,
45 N.E. 1116 (1897).
11. Instant case at 645.
12. Florence Pearlman, 4 T.C. 34, 47 (1944), aff'd, 153 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1946).
The Tax Court stated that the taxpayer's wife was not a transferee as to policies in
which she was at all times the named beneficiary.
13. United States v. Goddard, 111 F. Supp. 607 (W.D.N.Y. 1952); Christine
D. Muller, 10 T.C. 678 (1948).
14. P-H 1953 T.C. MEm. DEc. 53,198, rev'd, 212 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1954).
15. Id. at 590.
16. Tyson v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1954).
17. HumNER, Lma INsuRANcE 276-82 (4th ed. 1950).
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The effect of those previous decisions which held transferees liable
for the face value was to give greater weight to the need for revenue than
to the interest of beneficiaries. In view of the social and economic pur-
poses of life insurance, and the protection given to beneficiaries by state
and federal legislation, this result is undesirable. Proceeds payable to
the wife or family of the insured are usually exempt from creditors under
state law, if premium payments were reasonable 18 or not over a stated
amount.19 The Federal Government allows a bankrupt to retain his
policies on payment of the cash surrender value to the trustee -o and,
further, grants substantial benefits to the insured and the beneficiary in
both income 21 and estate taxes.2 Assuming that "property" is defined
so as to protect the interest of beneficiaries, there still remains a choice as
to what shall be deemed the "property" transferred: the insured's the-
oretical interest or the cash surrender value. For gift tax purposes, a
policy is valued at its theoretical worth; 2 however, the proper inquiry
under § 311 is not how much was given away, but what portion the insured
could have used to pay taxes. Since there is no available market for the
theoretical value of his property, the court's choice of the cash surrender
value seems to be the most practical measure.
Limitation of Actions--Bailments-
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS ACTION FOR
CONVERSION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY BAILEE
Since 1942 some logging machinery had lain without evidence of
ownership on a tract of land which the defendant purchased in 1944 and
possessed since that time. The paper title to the machinery was trans-
ferred by its owners several times since 1946, the plaintiff acquiring a
limited interest in 1950 and full ownership in 1952. None of the trans-
ferees ever notified the defendant of their claims, asserted any dominion
over the machinery, or objected when unknown persons removed parts
from it at various times. Prior to 1952 the defendant had not claimed
the machinery but, instead, had made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts
18. See Annot., 31 A.L.R. 51 (1924) ; 34 A.L.R. 838 (1925).
19. E.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 166. Similar statutes have been enacted in most
jurisdictions.
20. 30 STAT. 566 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1952).
21. int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b) (1), as amended, 67 STAT. 471 (1953), now
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(d). See also Commissioner v. Pierce, 146 F.2d 388
(2d Cir. 1944).
22. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, §2042(2).
23. U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.19(i) (1952).
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to discover its owner.' In that year he first desired to develop the sur-
rounding land in a manner which required removal of the machinery, and,
since he could find no one interested in it for its original purpose,
2 he sold
the remaining parts as scrap for $165. Immediately after the sale the
plaintiff sued for conversion, claiming that the value of the machinery was
$2500.3 The trial court held that the suit was barred by the three year
statute of limitations. The appellate court affirmed; the majority opinion,
in which four of the eight judges concurred, held that, although the
owners' cause of action was incomplete until an owner demanded the ma-
chinery, the aim of the statute would be negatived if it could be tolled by
their forebearance to do so; thus, the statute had run since demand could
have been made at any time after the machinery came to rest on the de-
fendant's land. Three judges believed that the statute had not run; one
judge dissented for this reason, the second concurred in the court's result
on the theory that the machinery had been abandoned, and the third con-
curred without stating a reason. A fourth judge also disagreed with the
court's rationale, but concurred on the ground that the defendant had
ripened a title by adverse possession. 4  Jones v. Jacobson, 273 P.2d 97
(Wash. 1954).
At common law, there was no duty to account for the goods of another
unless a person had contracted to do so,' or had committed a tortious
act.6 However, courts desired to impose some responsibility on one who
was involuntarily in possession of goods not his own.
7  Since the relation
was similar to a bailment, and since a voluntary bailee's duty not to with-
hold the goods on demand and his right to recover the reasonable value of
storage 8 seemed to be those which the law wished to apply to the in-
voluntary depositary, the law of bailments was extended.
9 However, in
1. The trial court found as a fact that the defendant was justified in believing
that the machinery was abandoned.
2. Memorandum Opinion of the trial court as set forth in Brief for Respondent,
p. 19.
3. Brief for Appellant, p. 10.
4. The theory apparently was that the defendant's possession of the machinery
was adverse to the plaintiff merely because the defendant allowed it to remain on
land which he owned but did not use.
5. EDwARDs, BAILMENTS 1-2 (3d ed. 1893); LAWsoN, BAILMENTS 9 (1895);
STORY, BAILMENTS 2-5 (9th ed. 1878).
6. See, Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Pa. 393, 399 (1851) (dictum that
involuntary depositary would not have been liable had he pushed property into river
which deposited it).
7. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 367-68 (1936).
8. Preston v. Neale, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 222 (1858); Moline, Milburn &
Stoddard Co. v. Neville, 52 Neb. 574, 72 N.W. 854 (1897); cf. Grice v. Berkner,
148 Minn. 64, 180 N.W. 923 (1921); Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871)
(finder can recover reasonable value of storage). An involuntary depositary is
also allowed to recover expenses caused by wrongful delay in removal of property.
Accord, Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Pa. 393 (1851).
9. Burk v. Dempster, 34 Neb. 426, 51 N.W. 976 (1892); Murphy v. Schwark,
117 Wash. 461, 201 Pac. 757 (1921); cf. Campbell & Davis v. Moll, 205 Mo. App.
49, 217 S.W. 538 (1920); Beauchamp v. Leypoldt, 108 Neb. 510, 188 N.W. 179
(1922); Smith v. Nashua & Lowell R.R., 27 N.H. 86 (1853). But cf. Weinstein v.
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the rare cases where reasonable conduct would not discharge an ordinary
bailee, such as a non-negligent misdelivery, an "involuntary bailee" was
relieved from liability when his conduct satisfied the usual tort standard. 10
Although the transition from the bailment to the tort standard has been
slow, the logical future development of this process would seem to be that
the involuntary bailee could avoid liability even if he wilfully but reason-
ably destroyed the goods."
In cases of bailments for an indefinite term, whether voluntary or
involuntary, there is no tort against the bailor for the purpose of running
the statute of limitations until the bailment is repudiated by the bailee,'
2
as where he sells the goods or refuses to return them on demand. Absent
any adverse possession by the bailee, laches of the bailor ordinarily is not
sufficient.' 3 However, in some cases the statute has been invoked even
though there was no actual repudiation, 14 the doctrinal requirement of a
repudiation being satisfied by presumptions that the owner had demanded
the goods and the bailee had refused to return them.'5 The controlling
factor in deciding whether the presumptions will be invoked seems to be
the reasonableness under the circumstances of the length of time during
which the bailor delayed.16
Modern Silk Co., 170 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1918) (involuntary depositary
on whom goods were thrust despite his protests was not liable for loss though
he placed them in a public corridor where they were likely to be taken). Compare
Gilson v. Fisk, 8 N.H. 404 (1836), with Cory v. Little, 6 N.H. 213 (1833).
10. United States Mfg. Co. v. Stevens, 52 Mich. 330, 17 N.W. 934 (1883);
Cowen v. Pressprich, 202 App. Div. 796, 194 N.Y. Supp. 926 (1922), adopting dis-
senting opinion below of Lehnmn, J., 117 Misc. 663, 676, 192 N.Y. Supp. 242, 249
(Sup. Ct.) ; Krumsky v. Loeser, 37 Misc. 504, 75 N.Y. Supp. 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1902) ;
Morris v. The Third Avenue R.R., 1 Daly 202 (N.Y.C.P. 1862); cf. Hope v. Cos-
tello, 222 Mo. App. 187, 297 S.W. 100 (1927) (although the court held there was no
bailment because there was no acceptance of delivery, all of the elements of an
involuntary bailment were present). See Note, The Legal Status of an Involuntary
Depositary, 22 CoL. L. REv. 354 (1922).
11. Laidlaw, Principles of Bailmnents, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 286, 306-10 (1931).
12. Blount v. Beall, 95 Ga. 182, 22 S.E. 52 (1894); Faison v. Patout, 212 La.
37, 31 So.2d 416 (1947); Brady v. Garrett, 66 S.W.2d 502, rehearing, 66 S.W2d
504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Carleton v. Lovejoy, 54 Me. 445 (1867) (defendant
borrowed goods, and plaintiff's suit for conversion was dismissed for failure to prove
that he demanded his goods before suit). 2 WooD, LImiTATIQN OF AcrioNs § 183
(4th ed. 1916); 6 WnLuSToN, CoNTRACTs § 2037 (rev. ed. 1938).
13. BROWN, PERsoNAL PROPERTY 23 (1936). But see Amzs, LECTUREs ON LEGAL
HiSTORY 197-202 (1913).
14. Smith v. Smith's Estate, 91 Mich. 7, 51 N.W. 694 (1892); Thompson v.
Whitaker Iron Co., 41 W. Va. 574, 23 S.E. 795 (1895); accord, Fallon v. Fallon,
110 Minn. 213, 124 N.W. 994 (1910).
15. The period of time after which the presumptions are invoked is usually the
statutory period for bringing an action. See note 14 supra.
16. Slack v. Bryan, 299 Ky. 132, 184 S.W.2d 873 (1945) (see discussion at 139,
184 S.W.2d at 877 and cases cited therein). For other cases where the presumptions
were not invoked, see Shewmaker v. Shifflett, 205 Ark. 875, 171 S.W.2d 309 (1943) ;
Webster v. Mountain Monarch Gold Mining Co., 6 Cal. App.2d 450, 44 P.2d 646
(1935); Dutton Hotel Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 69 Colo. 229, 193 Pac. 549 (1920);
Bourne v. State Bank of Orlando & Trust Co., 106 Fla. 46, 142 So. 810 (1932);
Gehres v. Ater, 148 Ohio St. 89, 73 N.E.2d 513 (1947) ; MacDonald v. Leverington
Construction Co., 331 Pa. 381, 200 Atl. 8 (1938); Amer v. Gebhart, 31 West. 127
(Pa. C.P. 1947). See also first three cases note 12 supra.
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In the instant case the defendant was an involuntary bailee under a
duty to return the machinery on timely demand or justify his failure to
do so. The court treated abandonment as a major issue, but in light
of the several intervening transfers of the machinery there is not enough
evidence for the defendant to reach the jury, since he must prove an intent
to abandon on the part of the plaintiff or his predecessors.1
7 Having
concluded that plaintiff has not abandoned the property, it must then be
decided whether the statute of limitations bars his action. Although there
was no actual repudiation of the bailment until 1952, there is ample justifi-
cation for presuming a "demand and refusal" to run the statute if plaintiff
acted unreasonably. The court or jury 1 8 could find that plaintiff acted
reasonably on the grounds that apparently he had no present use for the
machinery, that possession of it would have been a burden, and that the
unimproved condition of the land plus the lack of any adverse claim
justified his failure to assert his ownership. On the other hand, it could
be found that allowing defendant reasonably to believe that the machinery
was abandoned was so unjustifiable that property in the machinery should
be transferred to defendant regardless of its value. In balancing these
equities, no decided case seems to be controlling. In MacDonald v. Lever-
ington Construction Co.,19 the closest case on point, plaintiff placed his
machinery on vacant land without the knowledge or consent of the owner.
After the three year statutory period had lapsed, and after unsuccessful
efforts to ascertain the owner of the machinery, the landowner sold the
machinery to the defendant, informing him of all the facts. In a suit for
replevin immediately after the sale, the court held that the statute had not
run since there was no claim adverse to the plaintiff prior to the sale.
However, the MacDonald case can be distinguished from the instant case,
since in MacDonald there was no finding that the defendant reasonably
believed that the machinery had been abandoned. But, even if it is deter-
mined that the instant plaintiff's claim is not stale, he cannot recover the
full value of the machinery unless he can prove that defendant committed
a tort. The finding on this question should have been that defendant
acted reasonably even though he allowed the machinery to be destroyed.20
However, the fact that defendant should not be liable in tort does not
entitle him to a profit on the sale of another's goods, and the plaintiff
should have a valid claim for $165 on a theory analogous to money had
and received. If the machinery had any value in excess of $165, plaintiff
should bear the loss for his failure to obtain defendant's permission to
store the machinery. But if plaintiff's property right is to be preserved,
17. Foulke v. New York Consolidated R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237 (1920).
18. In prior cases the courts have determined whether or not to invoke the
presumptions which would bar the plaintiff. However, since the deciding factor seems
to be the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct, it is suggested that it is more
appropriate for the jury to make the determination.
19. 331 Pa. 381, 200 Atl. 8 (1938).
20. But cf. Massachusetts Lubricant Corp. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 305 Mass.
269, 25 N.E.2d 719 (1940).
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defendant also has a good claim; he may recover for the reasonable value
of storage 21 and for inconvenience caused by plaintiff's wrongful deposit.
On the peculiar facts of this case, the court reached a just result: if the
plaintiff acted unreasonably, the defendant ripened a prescriptive title to
the machinery, while, if the plaintiff acted reasonably, the amount of de-
fendant's damages might have been found to equal the amount he held for
plaintiff as proceeds of the sale.
21. Cf. RESTATEmENT, REsTiTuTioxN § 129, illustration 2 (1937) (person who
uses path across land without knowledge of land owner is liable in tort for reasonable
value of use of the land).
